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In	   certain	   cases,	   as	   the	   saying	   suggests,	   one	  
remains	  a	  philosopher	  only	  by	  –	  being	  silent.	  
Nietzsche,	  Human	  all	  too	  Human,	  Preface	  
If	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  Critique	  of	  Judgment	  represents	  an	  internal	  threat	  to	  the	  foundations	  
of	  Pure	  Reason	  (Cacciari	  [1982]:	  87)	  something	  very	  similar	  can	  be	  claimed	  about	  the	  re-­‐
lationship	  between	  Philosophical	  Investigations	  and	  Tractatus	  Logico-­‐Philosophicus.	  
Some	   light	   can	  be	  cast	  on	  Wittgenstein’s	  work	  by	   considering	   this	  ambivalence:	  on	  
one	  hand	  the	  Notebooks	  1914	  –	  1916	  show	  us	  the	  background	  from	  which	  the	  Tractatus	  
emerges,	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   a	   great	   amount	   of	  Wittgenstein’s	   later	   considerations	   go	  
back	  to	  weigh	  up	  and	  process	  its	  assumptions	  and	  its	  structures1.	  
The	  Notebooks	  are	  a	  sort	  of	  magmatic	  mass	  from	  which	  the	  pure	  distillate	  of	  1921	  is	  
extracted,	  almost	  as	  if	  every	  proposition	  was	  a	  result	  of	  a	  crystallization	  of	  originally	  ex-­‐
tremely	   fluid	  and	  heterogeneous	  elements.	  Conversely	   the	  Philosophical	   Investigations	  
and	   the	  Philosophical	  Remarks	   –	  but	   also	   the	  Philosophical	  Grammar,	   the	  Remarks	  on	  
the	  Philosophy	  of	  Psychology	  and	  On	  Certainty	  –	  go	  back	  to	  the	  same	  ruptures,	  tracing	  
the	  inevitable	  imperfections,	  implicit	  in	  every	  crystallization,	  and	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	  mere	  
need	  of	  finding	  peace	  in	  a	  determined	  linguistic	  formulation.	  
Von	  Wright	  inquired	  from	  an	  historical,	  documental	  and	  conceptual	  point	  of	  view	  the	  
complicated	   stratigraphy	   of	   Wittgenstein’s	   Tractatus,	   besides	   having	   found	   its	   early	  
draft:	   the	   so-­‐called	   Prototractatus.	   Although	   the	   remaining	   notebooks	   force	   us	   to	   a	  
sketchy	  reconstruction	  (von	  Wright	  [1982]:	  99-­‐103)	  –	  as	  at	   least	  four	  of	  them	  from	  the	  
 
1	  One	  of	  the	  most	  clear	  examples	  –	  a	  real	  withdrawal	  –	  concerns	  the	  moving	  on	  from	  the	  logical	  
atomism	  of	  the	  Tractatus	  to	  a	  principle	  of	  context.	  On	  this	  topic:	  Berto	  (2003):	  44-­‐46	  and	  Lamb	  
(1979).	  The	  most	  significant	  point	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  every	  issue	  used	  by	  Wittgenstein	  in	  order	  to	  de-­‐
construct	  his	   first	   theoretical	  plan	   can	  be	   found,	   at	   least	   in	  nuce	   in	   the	  Tractatus	   itself.	   For	   in-­‐
stance	  the	  principle	  of	  context,	  whose	  role	  will	  be	  crucial	  in	  the	  so	  called	  second	  Wittgenstein	  in	  
a	   dialectical	   –	   olistic	   conception,	   can	   be	   found	   in	   proposition	   3.3:	   «Only	   the	   proposition	   has	  
sense;	  only	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  proposition	  has	  a	  name	  meaning»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1971]).	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time	  of	   the	  war	   are	  missing	  –	   Italo	  Valent’s	   thesis	   seems	   to	  be	   likely:	   «the	  process	  of	  
composing	  the	  work	  […]	  was	  not	  following	  a	  pre-­‐ordered	  scheme,	  it	  was	  rather	  formed	  
gradually,	   through	   later	   interventions	   and	   redistribution	   of	   the	   propositions	   –	   after	   a	  
first	  selection,	  in	  an	  open	  order	  of	  remarks	  or	  blocks	  of	  remarks,	  taken	  from	  the	  prepar-­‐
atory	  notebooks»	  (Valent	  [1989]:	  34).	  
Whatever	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   preparatory	  material	   and	   the	   ultimate	   for-­‐
mulation	  of	  1921,	   the	  author	   surely	  went	  back	   to	   incessantly	  question	   the	  whole	  con-­‐
sistency	  of	  that	  system.	  
Even	  if	  we	  leave	  aside	  Wittgenstein’s	  well	  known	  withdrawals	  from	  the	  theories	  ex-­‐
posed	   in	   the	  Tractatus	  –	   suffice	   to	  mention	   the	  Preface	  of	   the	  Philosophical	   Investiga-­‐
tions	   and	  more	   generally	   «the	   sack	   the	   Investigations	   gave	   to	   the	   Tractatus»	   (Valent	  
[1989]:	  166)	  and	  other	  passages	  of	  The	  Big	  Typescript2	  –	  we	  can	   find	   in	  Wittgenstein’s	  
work	  considered	  as	  a	  whole	  a	  constant	  spur	  on	  rethinking	  and	  rewriting	  its	  main	  topics:	  
we	  will	  take	  into	  consideration	  some	  of	  them.	  
Besides	  the	  conflict	  between	  semantic	  molecularism	  and	  principle	  of	  context,	  some	  
other	  issues	  are	  to	  be	  mentioned:	  the	  explicit	  contrast	  between	  simple	  objects	  and	  gen-­‐
eral	  form	  of	  the	  proposition	  (particularly	  the	  lack	  in	  the	  account	  of	  grammar	  rules,	  as	  far	  
as	  the	  formulation	  of	  1921	  is	  concerned)3;	  the	  necessity	  of	  finding	  a	  rigorous	  definition	  
of	   language,	  a	  necessity	  that	   leads	  to	  ungovernable	  consequences;	  the	   idea	  of	  world	  –	  
dominating	   the	   first	   part	   of	   the	   Tractatus	   –	   compared	   with	   the	   mystic	   dimension	  
brought	  about	  in	  the	  final	  pages.	  
Behind	  these	  contrasting	  poles	  we	  can	  see	  «the	  gap	  of	  arbitrary	  Wittgenstein	  had	  al-­‐
ready	  seen	  in	  the	  Tractatus	  threatening	  from	  behind	  and	  from	  the	  inside	  the	  logical	  ap-­‐
proach	   to	   signs»	   (Valent	   [1989]:	  122).	   If	  we	  dare	   to	  express	   in	  an	  extremely	  brief	  way	  
what	  occurs	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  conception	  of	  language	  through	  the	  years,	  we	  can	  speak	  
of	  a	  progressive	  movement	  from	  the	  pictorial	  request	  to	  a	  model	  next	  to	  the	  musical	  di-­‐
mension.	  	  
The	  act	  of	  painting	   in	   fact	  bears	   the	  theme	  of	   the	  re-­‐presentation,	   thus	  matching	  a	  
certain	   realism,	   mostly	   observed	   as	   the	   main	   theme	   in	   the	   formulation	   of	   Tractatus.	  
However,	  we	  cannot	  reduce	  this	  work	  to	  a	  mere	  realistic	  point	  of	  view	  without	  making	  a	  
 
2	  Wittgenstein	  (2005):	  101:	  «My	  view	  in	  the	  Tractatus	  Logico-­‐Philosophicus	  was	  wrong:	  1.12.	  be-­‐
cause	  I	  didn’t	  clearly	  understand	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  words	  “a	  logical	  product	  is	  hidden	  in	  a	  proposi-­‐
tion”».	  
3	  Wittgenstein	  (1975):	  109:	  «What	  I	  said	  in	  the	  Tractatus	  doesn’t	  exhaust	  the	  grammatical	  rules	  
for	  ‘and’,	  ‘not’,	  ‘or’	  etc.;	  there	  are	  rules	  for	  the	  truth	  functions	  which	  also	  deal	  with	  the	  elemen-­‐
tary	  part	  of	  the	  proposition».	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trivialization.	  Wittgenstein	   is	  too	  Viennese	  for	   it:	  he	  does	  not	  see	   in	   language	  the	  pure	  
and	  simple	  representation	  of	  reality,	  as	  if	  expression	  itself	  could	  be	  a	  mere	  mold	  of	  the	  
world,	  he	  rather	  sees	  it	  as	  something	  that	  forces	  us	  to	  think	  about	  the	  enigma	  of	  what	  is	  
projected.	  
In	  this	  way,	  language	  seems	  to	  suggest	  at	  least	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  reality,	  by	  raising	  
the	  question	  of	  its	  congruence	  with	  it.	  This	  account	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  realism	  is	  explicit	  
in	  the	  Notebooks:	  «The	  form	  of	  a	  picture	  might	  be	  called	  that	  in	  which	  the	  picture	  MUST	  
agree	   with	   the	   reality	   (in	   order	   to	   be	   capable	   of	   portraying	   it	   at	   all)»	   (Wittgenstein	  
[1961]:	  15).	  A	   theme	  that	  will	  be	  exposed	   in	  an	  even	  more	   iconic	  manner	   through	  the	  
idea	   according	   to	   which	   «the	   proposition	   is	   a	   measure	   of	   the	   world»	   (Wittgenstein	  
[1961]:	  41)	  –	  repeated,	  with	  evident	  variations	   in	  the	  countless	  reflections	  on	  the	  con-­‐
nection	  between	  yardstick	  and	  world.	  
The	  hypothesis	  of	  a	  simple	  realism	  is	  to	  be	  rejected.	  Wittgenstein	   lived	   in	  the	  same	  
cultural	   atmosphere	   of	  Max	   Planck,	  who	   in	   one	   of	   his	  most	   famous	  writings	   came	   to	  
such	  conclusions:	  	  
Suppose	  we	  have	  found	  a	  physical	  account	  of	  the	  world	  that	  satisfies	  every	  need,	  so	  that	  it	  
can	  represent	  in	  a	  perfectly	  exact	  way	  every	  law	  of	  nature	  empirically	  found.	  We	  could	  nev-­‐
er,	   in	  no	  way,	  give	  evidence	  that	  that	  account	   is	  similar,	  even	  approximately	  to	  real	  nature	  
[…].	  To	  do	  so	  we	  should	  know	  something	  certain	  about	  real	  nature	  and	  that	  is	  obviously	  im-­‐
possible.	  In	  front	  of	  us	  there	  is	  an	  enormous	  gap,	  that	  no	  science	  can	  ever	  penetrate.	  To	  fill	  
this	  gap	  is	  not	  a	  duty	  for	  pure	  reason,	  but	  for	  practical	  reason.	  (Planck	  [1933]:	  45)	  
This	  kind	  of	  position	  is	  very	  close	  to	  the	  link	  between	  ethics	  and	  world	  expressed	  in	  
the	  Tractatus:	  at	  the	  bottom	  and	  beyond	  every	  inquiry	  about	  the	  world	  there	  is	  the	  logi-­‐
cal	  indemonstrability	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  a	  world.	  
In	   spite	   all	   the	   subsequent	   clarifications,	  Wittgenstein’s	   conception	  of	   language	   re-­‐
mains	  strongly	  defined	  within	  “pictorial”	  terms.	  
The	   fateful	   expression	   is	   the	   proposition	   2.1:	   «We	   make	   to	   ourselves	   pictures	   of	  
facts».	  The	  thesis	  manifests	  itself	  –	  in	  Hegelian	  words	  (Hegel	  [1807]:	  12)	  –	  as	  «familiarly	  
known»,	  and	  thus	  not	  «properly	  known»:	  just	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  it	  is	  “familiar”,	  this	  as-­‐
sumption	  remains	  not	  inquired.	  On	  this	  point,	  the	  lack	  of	  foundations	  of	  the	  proposition	  
2.1,	  many	  critics	  (Sini	  [1994];	  De	  Carolis	  [1999])	  agree.	  	  
The	  pictorial	  connotation	  of	  language	  as	  representation	  of	  reality	  will	  keep	  on	  emerg-­‐
ing	   in	  Wittgenstein's	  work,	  not	  only	   in	   the	   form	  of	   the	  yardstick	  drawn	  up	   to	   reality	  –	  
where	   the	  measure	   is	   already	  a	   linguistic	   translation	  of	   the	  world	   into	   something	  else	  
(Wittgenstein	  [2005]:	  97)	  –	  but	  also	  in	  another	  idea,	  that	  constantly	  appears	  in	  Wittgen-­‐
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stein’s	  writings:	  «Because	  language	  doesn’t	  have	  any	  way	  of	  signifying	  something	  until	  it	  
gets	   it	   from	  what	   it	   signifies,	   from	  the	  world,	  no	   language,	  no	   language	   is	   conceivable	  
that	  doesn’t	  represent	  this	  world»	  (Wittgenstein	  [2005]:	  363).	  
In	  the	  end,	  Wittgenstein	  remains	  irresistibly	  attracted	  by	  the	  idea	  according	  to	  which	  
«The	  possibility	  of	  the	  proposition	  is,	  of	  course,	  founded	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  signs	  as	  GO-­‐
ING	  PROXY	  for	  objects»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1961]:	  37).	  
1.	  Language	  as	  Picture	  
The	  metaphor	  of	  language	  as	  a	  tool-­‐box	  belongs	  to	  the	  most	  important	  part	  of	  Wittgen-­‐
stein’s	  work:	  it	  is	  present	  in	  Philosophical	  Investigations	  (Wittgenstein	  [1953]:	  7),	  in	  the	  
Philosophical	  Grammar	   (Wittgenstein	   [1974]:	   33)	   and	   also	   in	  The	  Big	   Typescript	   (Witt-­‐
genstein	  [2005]:	  26).	  Implicit	  in	  this	  analogy	  is	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  reality	  on	  which	  we	  can	  op-­‐
erate	  with	  tools,	  whose	  usefulness	  goes	  together	  with	  their	  effectiveness.	  	  
Again,	   a	   realistic	   conception,	   at	   first	   sight.	   But	   as	   soon	   as	  we	   try	   to	   come	   to	   some	  
conclusions,	   the	   analogy	   is	   not	   solid	   anymore:	   the	   so	   called	   second	  phase	   in	  Wittgen-­‐
stein’s	  work	  deals	  with	  this	  constitutive	  fuzziness.	  	  
In	   the	  Philosophical	   Investigations	   in	   fact	   it	   is	   clear	  how	  the	  manipulation	  of	   reality	  
performed	  by	  the	  tool-­‐box	  results	  in	  an	  end	  only	  measurable	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  those	  same	  
instruments:	  we	  made	  a	  piece	  of	  wood	  shorter	  and	  we	  measure	  the	  effect	  with	  a	  ruler.	  
In	   the	  Philosophical	  Grammar	  we	  read	   instead	  about	   the	   impossibility	   to	  perfectly	  dis-­‐
tinguish	  the	  tools:	  they	  are	  often	  so	  related	  to	  each	  other	  with	  “kinds	  of	  relationships”	  
that	  a	  unique	  set	  of	  rules	  seems	  to	  be	  impossible.	  	  
Lastly,	  in	  The	  Big	  Typescript	  the	  description	  of	  the	  toolkit	  comes	  after	  the	  statement	  
that	  we	  never	  think	  about	  3	  o’	  clock	  by	  figuring	  the	  position	  of	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  clock:	  
the	  figure	  itself	  is	  just	  a	  tool.	  
If	  we	  evaluate	  these	  different	  discussions	  about	  the	  analogy	  between	   language	  and	  
toolkit,	  we	  come	  to	  two	  fundamental	  principles,	  very	  closely	  related:	  a)	  Every	  time	  we	  
try	  to	  continue	  with	  the	  analogy	  we	  lose	  that	  stable	  correspondence,	  very	  much	  desired,	  
between	   tool	   and	   reality,	   as	   if	   the	   tool	   showed	   us	   its	   tendency	   to	  withdraw	   into	   the	  
equipment	  itself;	  b)	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  reality	  remains	  untouched,	  just	  because	  the	  tool	  
can	  measure	  its	  effectiveness	  only	  within	  the	  equipment	  itself.	  
This	  alternating	  current	  movement	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  a	  famous	  Nietzsche	  fragment:	  
Has	  a	   force	  been	  demonstrated?	  No,	  only	  effects	   translated	   into	  a	   completely	   foreign	   lan-­‐
guage.	  We	  are	  so	  used,	  however,	  to	  regularity	  in	  succession	  that	  its	  oddity	  no	  longer	  seems	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odd	  to	  us.	  (Nietzsche,	  Will	  to	  power,	  §	  620)	  
Although	   a	   background	   realism	   is	   still	   present,	   a	   consequent	   account	   of	   language	  
puts	  in	  doubt	  that	  one	  could	  ever	  approach	  reality	  but	  through	  further	  linguistic	  transla-­‐
tions.	  Language	  seems	  to	  withdraw,	  describing	  a	  detached,	  independent	  world,	  beyond	  
any	  desire	  of	  evidence	  of	  the	  correctness	  of	  its	  representations.	  This	  question	  would	  be	  
developed	  in	  the	  second	  phase	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  work,	  but	  it	  was	  fully	  present	  in	  1921:	  
the	  analogy	  between	  language	  and	  picture	  shows	  from	  the	  beginning	  its	  weakness.	  
Beside	  the	  proposition	  2.1:	  «We	  make	  to	  ourselves	  pictures	  of	  facts»,	  there	   is	  3.13:	  
«To	  the	  proposition	  belongs	  everything	  which	  belongs	  to	  the	  projection;	  but	  not	  what	  is	  
projected».	  Furthermore,	  the	  conclusion	  of	  proposition	  5.552:	  «logic	  is	  before	  the	  How,	  
not	  before	  the	  What»4.	  
In	   the	   later	   considerations	   these	   suggestions	   that	   demand,	   iuxta	   propria	   principia,	  
the	  internal	  consistency	  and	  coherence	  of	  the	  Tractatus	  Logico-­‐Philosophicus	  are	  taken	  
into	  consideration.	  Philosophical	  Investigations	  show	  us	  this	  inquiry	  about	  language	  as	  a	  
“picture	  of	  reality”:	  
What	  this	  language	  primarily	  describes	  is	  a	  picture.	  What	  is	  to	  be	  done	  with	  the	  picture,	  how	  
it	  is	  to	  be	  used,	  is	  still	  obscure.	  Quite	  clearly,	  however,	  it	  must	  be	  explored	  if	  we	  want	  to	  un-­‐
derstand	  the	  sense	  of	  what	  we	  are	  saying.	  But	  the	  picture	  seems	  to	  spare	  us	  this	  work;	  it	  al-­‐
ready	  points	  to	  a	  particular	  use.	  This	  is	  how	  it	  takes	  us	  in.	  (Wittgenstein	  [1953]:	  184)	  
This	  clarification	  of	  the	  picture	  has	  serious	  consequences:	  it	  shows	  us	  that	  the	  picture	  
does	  not	  demand	  a	  sense	  –	  it	  has	  it	  already;	  it	  reveals	  itself	  in	  a	  certain	  sense.	  So,	  what	  
does	   it	  mean	  to	  get	   the	  quid	  of	  a	  picture?	  What	  makes	  anything	   in	   the	  picture	  under-­‐
standable?	  This	  core	  of	  sense	  is	  not	  anything	  pictorial	  either.	  	  
Wittgenstein	  compares	  it	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  perceiving	  a	  facial	  expression	  «the	  rein-­‐
terpretation	  of	  a	  facial	  expression	  can	  be	  compared	  to	  the	  reinterpretation	  of	  a	  chord	  in	  
music,	  when	  we	  hear	  it	  as	  a	  modulation	  first	  into	  this,	  then	  into	  that	  key»	  (Wittgenstein	  
[1953]:	  144).	  The	  possibility	  of	  understanding	  a	  facial	  expression	  does	  not	  have	  a	  “picto-­‐
rial	  connotation”,	  it	  rather	  resembles	  the	  interpretation	  of	  music.	  
 
4	  On	  this	  topic	  the	  well	  renowned	  6.44:	  «It	  is	  not	  how	  things	  are	  in	  the	  world	  that	  is	  mystical,	  but	  
that	  it	  exists».	  (L.	  Wittgenstein	  [1971]).	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2.	  Brief	  Remarks	  on	  Hegel’s	  Aesthetics	  
It	  would	  be	   right	   to	   try	   to	   legitimate	  or	  at	   least	   to	  support	   the	  movement	  of	  Wittgen-­‐
stein’s	  thoughts	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  painting	  and	  music	  within	  a	  wider	  histori-­‐
cal	  and	  philosophical	  context,	  with	  particular	  regard	  to	  Hegel’s	  Aesthetics.	  	  
In	  Wittgenstein’s	  theory,	  as	  far	  as	  the	  comprehension	  of	  a	  sentence	  is	  concerned,	  we	  
are	  taken	  on	  an	  inescapable	  transition	  from	  the	  pictorial	  model	  of	  the	  picture	  theory	  to	  
a	  sort	  of	  “musical”	  perspective:	  from	  a	  strongly	  representative	  model	  to	  a	  looser	  system.	  
By	  reading	  Kojève’s	  comments	  on	  Kandinsky’s	  concrete	  art,	  or	  Foucault’s	  comments	  
on	   perspective	   in	   Velasquez’	   Las	  Meninas,	   one	   can	   easily	   understand	   that	   painting	   is	  
never	  mere	  reproduction,	  but	  also,	  at	   the	  same	  time,	  creation.	  This	  aspect	  of	  creation	  
can	  be	  detected	  even	  more	  easily	   in	  music,	  because,	  as	  Hegel	   taught	   in	  his	   lessons	  on	  
Aesthetics,	  the	  one-­‐dimensionality	  of	  sound	  shows	  us	  a	  superior	  abstraction,	  compared	  
to	   the	   bi-­‐dimensionality	   to	   which	   a	   painting	   is	   constrained	   (even	   if	   for	   this	   bi-­‐
dimensionality	   an	   abstraction	   from	   the	   third	   dimension	   is	   still,	   according	   to	  Hegel,	   an	  
example	  of	  the	  Spirit’s	  creative	  power).	  
In	   the	  conceptual	   system	  of	   the	  arts,	   as	   it	   is	   conceived	  by	  Hegel,	   Flemish	  art	   is	   the	  
point	   in	  which	  we	   see	   the	   passage	   from	   colour	   to	   sound.	   In	   the	   famous	   Telburg	   silk5.	  
Colors	   combine,	   just	  as	   the	   sounds	   in	  an	  orchestra	  heard	   from	  a	  certain	  distance,	  and	  
sound	   together	   as	   a	  harmony.	   	   If	   painting	  produces	   this	   effort,	   longing	   to	   achieve	   the	  	  	  
unitary	  harmony	  of	  music,	  sound	  itself	  is	  free:	  absolute	  possibility	  of	  themes	  and	  varia-­‐
tions.	  
Between	  painting	  and	  music	  subsists	  the	  same	  relationship	  that	  we	  can	  analogically	  
draw	  between	  physics6	  and	  mathematics:	  the	  first	  has	  to	  take	  into	  some	  consideration	  
the	  reality	  it	  measures	  and	  represents,	  the	  latter	  is	  pure,	  non	  representative	  production.	  
Critics	   (Janik	   [1966]:	   76-­‐95	   and	   also	   Engel	   [1969)]:	   285-­‐302)	   have	   underlined	  Witt-­‐
genstein’s	  continuity	  with	  Schopenhauer,	  with	  regard	  to	  this	  non-­‐representative	  quality	  
of	  music:	  «music	  will	  have	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  copy	  of	  an	  original	  which	  can	  never	  it-­‐
self	  be	  directly	  presented	  as	  idea»	  (Schopenhauer	  [1886]:	  I,	  332).	  
 
5	  According	  to	  Hegel:	  «Nehmen	  wir,	  z.	  B.,	  Terborchs	  Atlas,	  so	  ist	  jeder	  Fleck	  der	  Farbe	  für	  sich	  ein	  
mattes	  Grau,	  mehr	  oder	  weniger	  weißlich,	  bläulich,	  gelblich,	  aber	  in	  einiger	  Entfernung	  durch	  die	  
Stellung	  zum	  anderen	  kommt	  der	  schöne,	  milde	  Glanz	  hervor,	  der	  dem	  wirklichen	  Atlas	  eigen	  ist».	  
(Hegel	  [1838]:	  14,	  228).	  
6	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact	  even	  physics	  in	  its	  contemporary	  age	  departs	  from	  the	  pure	  and	  simple	  de-­‐
scription	  of	  reality.	  Overcoming	  a	  mere	  representative	  conception	  of	   language	  in	  poetry,	  music,	  
science,	  constitutes	  one	  of	  the	  main	  themes	  for	  Wittgenstein’s	  age.	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The	  non-­‐pictorial	  feature	  of	  music	  makes	  this	  art	  completely	  abstract	  and	  detached:	  
a	  position	  that	  music	  shares,	  in	  fact,	  with	  mathematics	  and	  of	  which	  Wittgenstein,	  in	  the	  
Philosophical	   Investigations,	   is	  perfectly	  aware:	  «“But	  mathematical	   truth	   is	   independ-­‐
ent	  of	  whether	  human	  beings	  know	  it	  or	  not!”	  […].	  Of	  course,	  in	  one	  sense	  mathematics	  
is	  a	  branch	  of	  knowledge,	  –	  but	  still	  it	  is	  also	  an	  activity»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1953]:	  226-­‐227).	  
The	  same	  independence	  is	  conceived	  by	  Wittgenstein	  as	  a	  property	  peculiar	  to	  mu-­‐
sic:	  «A	  tune	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  tautology;	  it	  is	  complete	  in	  itself,	  it	  satisfies	  itself»	  (Wittgenstein	  
[1953]:	  40).	  Tautology	  cannot	  be	  verified	  and	  doesn’t	  need	  to	  find	  empirical	  proof.	  We	  
need	  to	  understand	  in	  which	  extent	  this	  autonomy,	  typical	  for	  music	  and	  mathematics,	  
can	  be	  valid	  in	  the	  case	  of	  language.	  
3.	  Musical	  Nuances	  and	  Pictorial	  Technique	  
Let	  us	  go	  back	  to	  the	  question	  of	  understanding	  a	  proposition.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  musical	  
tone	  of	  a	   face,	  Wittgenstein	  suggests	  several	   times	   the	  example	  of	  aroma:	  «The	  eye	  –	  
we	  read	  in	  the	  Observations	  on	  Philosophy	  of	  Psychology	  –	  doesn’t	  distinguish	  the	  figure	  
as	  a	  wire	  frame	  from	  the	  figure	  as	  a	  box,	  etc.	  This	   is	  so	  to	  speak	  the	  aroma,	  which	  the	  
brain	  supplies	  to	  what	  it	  has	  seen»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1980]:	  7).	  And	  more	  specifically	  in	  the	  
following	  passage:	  	  
It	  s	  as	  if	  the	  word	  that	  I	  understand	  had	  a	  definite	  slight	  aroma	  that	  corresponds	  to	  my	  un-­‐
derstanding	  of	   it.	  As	   if	  two	  familiar	  words	  were	  distinguished	  not	  merely	  by	  their	  sound	  or	  
their	   appearance,	   but	   by	   an	   atmosphere	   as	  well,	   even	  when	   I	   do	  not	   imagine	   anything	   in	  
connection	  with	  them.	  But	  remember	  how	  the	  names	  of	  famous	  poets	  and	  composers	  seem	  
to	  have	  taken	  up	  a	  peculiar	  meaning	  into	  themselves.	  So	  that	  one	  can	  say	  the	  names	  “Bee-­‐
thoven”	  and	  “Mozart”	  and	  they	  do	  not	  merely	  sound	  different;	  no,	  they	  are	  also	  accompa-­‐
nied	  by	  a	  different	  character.	  But	  if	  you	  had	  to	  describe	  these	  characters	  more	  closely,	  would	  
you	  point	  to	  their	  portraits	  or	  to	  their	  music?	  (Wittgenstein	  [1980]:	  49-­‐50)	  
We	  should	  be	  clear	  from	  the	  entire	  context	  how	  the	  aroma	  constitutes	  an	  attempt	  –	  
as	  the	  musical	  atmosphere	  does	  –	  to	  take	  away	  the	  proposition	  from	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  com-­‐
plete	  representation	  and	  perfect	  detectability	  of	  its	  functions	  of	  truth.	  Beyond	  the	  prop-­‐
osition	  as	  a	  technique	  that	  pictures	  reality,	  beyond	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  toolkit,	  some-­‐
thing	   irreducible	   to	   the	  mere	   representation	   remains:	  «the	  “aspect-­‐blind”	  will	  have	  an	  
altogether	  different	  relationship	  to	  pictures	  from	  ours»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1953]:	  214).	  
The	  faculty	  of	  understanding	  the	  sense	  is	  analogous	  to	  a	  good	  ear	  for	  music,	  not	  just	  
in	  the	  sense	  that	  every	  proposition	  assumes	  its	  meaning	  from	  its	  internal	  rhythm	  and	  in-­‐
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ternal	  structures,	  but	  also	  because	  in	  every	  proposition	  the	  echo	  of	  language	  as	  a	  whole	  
is	  to	  be	  recognized.	  
Every	  proposition	  can	  be	  compared	  to	  a	  picture:	  but	   the	  picture	   is	  not	  mere	  repre-­‐
sentation,	  but	  also,	  a	  point	  of	  view;	  understanding	  an	  image	  is	  not	  just	  perceiving	  single	  
elements,	   but	   also	   getting	   its	   perspective	   vision,	   its	   own	   “musical	   tone”.	   The	   compre-­‐
hension	   of	   language	   is	   expressly	   compared	   to	   the	   comprehension	   of	   a	   musical	   piece	  
(Wittgenstein	  [1980]:	  188),	  because	  it	  is	  not	  cognition	  of	  a	  single	  frame,	  but	  the	  faculty	  
of	  understanding	  at	  a	  glance7	  the	  entire	  sonority	  of	  that	  language	  (Wittgenstein	  [1953]:	  
77).	  
Music	  is	  the	  flavour	  of	  the	  world:	  in	  this	  sense	  there	  is	  an	  aroma	  in	  the	  propositions	  
that	   cannot	  be	   translated	   through	  a	  propositional	   system	  and	   that	   can	  only	  appear	   in	  
translation.	  
The	  act	  of	  understanding	  breaks	  the	  conception	  of	  language	  as	  a	  pure	  mirror	  of	  reali-­‐
ty.	   The	  question	  of	   the	   comprehension	   coincides	  with	   the	   rupture	  of	   the	  paragon	  be-­‐
tween	  language	  and	  picture,	  proposition	  and	  image.	  That	  picture	  demands	  to	  be	  treated	  
as	  a	  musical	  piece.	  
What	  does	  “getting	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  proposition”	  mean,	  according	  to	  Wittgenstein?	  It	  
means	  “to	  be	   translated	   into	  something	  else”:	  «Why	  am	   I	  whistling	   this	   just	   this	  way?	  
Why	  do	  I	  want	  to	  make	  my	  change	  in	  volume	  and	  tempo	  fit	  this	  very	  specific	  ideal?	  I’m	  
inclined	  to	  say:	  “Because	  I	  know	  what	  it	  all	  means”	  –	  but	  what	  does	  it	  mean?	  –	  I	  couldn’t	  
say	  other	   than	  by	   translating	   it	   into	  a	   sequence	   that	  had	   the	   same	   rhythm»	   (Wittgen-­‐
stein	  [2005]:	  114).	  
But	  this	  “something	  else”	  is	  another	  rhythm,	  that	  is	  an	  enclosed	  pattern,	  that	  can	  be	  
taken	  as	  a	   sort	  of	   independent	  melody.	  «When	   I’m	  understanding	  one	   thing	  do	   I	   as	   it	  
were	   think	  of	  another	   thing?	  Does	  understanding,	   that	   is,	   consist	  of	   thinking	  of	   some-­‐
thing	  else?	  And	  if	  that	   isn’t	  what	  I	  mean,	  then	  what’s	  understood	  is	  as	   it	  were	  autono-­‐
mous,	   and	   the	   understanding	   of	   it	   is	   comparable	   to	   the	   understanding	   of	   a	  melody»	  
(Wittgenstein	  [1974]:	  79).	  
That	  is	  why	  understanding	  a	  sentence	  in	  a	  foreign	  language	  can	  often	  be	  hard,	  even	  if	  
we	  have	  the	  translation	  of	  every	  single	  word	  of	  it:	  what	  is	  missing	  is	  the	  comprehensive	  
sense	   that	   cannot	  be	   reduced	   to	  a	   scheme	  or	   correspondence	  of	  unambiguous	   terms.	  
 
7	  Desideri	  (2008):	  141:	  «“Getting	  a	  sense”	  means	  to	  “comprehend”	  and	  reminds	  us	  that	  this	  ac-­‐
tion	  can	  be	  summarised	  in	  the	  unity	  of	  a	  rapid	  gesture,	  as	  the	  hand	  that	  grasps	  something	  in	  or-­‐
der	  to	  use	   it».	  These	  passages	  manifest	  their	  analogy	  to	  Kant’s	  unity	  of	  quality	  (cf.	  Kant	  [1787]:	  
§12,	  B	  114).	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«But	  I	  can	  say	  that	  I	  understand	  a	  sentence	  in	  a	  foreign	  language	  –	  say	  a	  Latin	  one	  that	  I	  
can	  only	  decipher	  by	  a	  painful	  effort	  to	  construe	  –	  even	  if	  I	  have	  only	  turned	  into	  English	  
bit	  by	  bit	  and	  have	  never	   succeeded	   in	  grasping	   the	  overall	  phrasing	  of	   the	  sentence»	  
(Wittgenstein	  [1974]:	  72).	  
This	  musical	   feature	   is	   insuppressible	   for	  any	  kind	  of	   linguistic	  dimension8	  that	  tries	  
to	   limit	   it	  or	   to	  specify	   its	   truth	  value.	   In	   this	  contest	   translation,	  as	  comprehension	  of	  
the	  sense,	  the	  falling	  back	  of	  language	  to	  itself	  and	  its	  independence	  from	  the	  pictured	  
reality	  is	  manifest.	  
As	  we	  know	  that	  understanding	  a	  proposition	  means	  to	  get	   its	   internal	  melody,	  we	  
must	  now	  underline	  that,	  according	  to	  Wittgenstein	  «a	  tune	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  tautology;	  it	   is	  
complete	  in	  itself,	  it	  satisfies	  itself»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1953]:	  40).	  
The	  musical	  dimension	  of	  language	  proves	  the	  complete	  autonomy	  of	  language	  in	  it-­‐
self	  and	  saves	  Wittgenstein’s	  position	  from	  Kripke’s	  critique	  in	  Naming	  and	  Necessity	  (on	  
this	   issue,	   Tripodi	   (2009):	   173-­‐177).	   Kripke	   refuses	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   emancipation	  
from	  a	  mere	  pictorial	  scheme	  towards	  a	  musical	  account	  of	  language:	  this	  misinterpreta-­‐
tion	  does	  not	  recognize	  the	  point	  that	  makes	  Wittgenstein’s	  position	  an	  unicum	  in	  ana-­‐
lytic	  philosophy9.	  
This	  proceeding	  from	  painting	  to	  music	  must	  not	  drive	  us	  to	  think	  that	  the	  Tractatus	  
logico-­‐philosophicus	  strictly	  belongs	  to	  the	  picture	  theory	  and	  that	  the	  later	  writings	  be-­‐
long	  to	  the	  musical	  one.	  The	  pictorial	  account	  of	  language	  has	  a	  strong	  influence	  in	  all	  of	  
Wittgenstein’s	  work,	  in	  spite	  all	  the	  contradictions	  it	  raises;	  conversely,	  in	  the	  Tractatus	  
music	  already	  plays	  an	  important	  role.	  Valent	  supports	  the	  theory	  according	  to	  which	  «it	  
is	   possible	   that	   the	   formal	   structure	   in	   the	  Tractatus	   closely	   follows	   the	   repartition	  of	  
the	  tonic	  scale»	  (Valent	  [1989]:	  36).	  	  
Heller	   compares	   the	   Tractatus	   logico-­‐philosophicus	   to	   Schönberg’s	   musical	   theory:	  
«there	  is	  a	  familiarity	  of	  logical	  structures,	  motives	  and	  intentions	  […]	  even	  Schönberg	  is	  
guided	  by	   the	   firm	  belief	   that	   the	  “language”	  he	  uses	  –	  music	  –	  has	   to	  be	  elevated	   to	  
that	  extent	  of	  logical	  necessity	  that	  eliminates	  every	  subjective	  accident»	  (Heller	  [1967]:	  
94-­‐95).	  
The	  problem	  of	  this	  comparison	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  language	  is	  always	  an	  understood	  
music	  –	  this	  understanding	  is	  clearly	  always	  a	  subjective	  accident,	  as	  it	  is	  performed	  only	  
by	   someone	  who	   has	   an	   ear	   for	   it.	  Wittgenstein	   is	   actually	   going	   towards	   Schönberg	  
 
8	  On	  this	  relationship	  between	  music	  and	  understanding	  a	  language	  cf.	  Lewis	  (1977):	  115-­‐120.	  
9	  Tripodi	  ([2009]:147)	  defined	  Wittgenstein’s	  awareness	  of	  what	  is	  beyond	  representation	  “Witt-­‐
genstein’s	  Aventino”.	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when	  he	  says	   that	  «signs	  have	  their	  meanings	  neither	  by	  virtues	  of	  what	  accompanies	  
them,	  nor	  because	  of	  what	  evokes	  them	  –	  but	  by	  virtue	  of	  a	  system	  to	  which	  they	  be-­‐
long»	   (Wittgenstein	   [2005]:	   155),	  making	   explicit	   that	   language	   is	   not	   an	   independent	  
creation	  of	  a	  hypothetical	  subject,	  but	  rather	  a	  complex	  of	  signs	  in	  which	  we	  all	  are	  im-­‐
mersed.	  On	   the	  other	  hand	   the	  accompaniment	   that	   gets	   the	  meaning	  –	   that	   internal	  
rhythm	  that	  a	  single	  proposition	  shares	  with	  all	  the	  propositions	  of	  the	  same	  language	  –	  
proves	   the	   faculty	  of	  «taking	   in	  a	  symbolism	  as	  a	  whole»	   (Wittgenstein	   [1974]:	  5),	  not	  
assimilable	  to	  a	  theory	  of	  harmony.	  
It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  Tractatus	  had	  very	  strong	  connections	  with	  the	  musical	  dimension,	  
although	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  bring	  them	  back	  to	  a	  real	  Harmonielehre.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  it	  is	  al-­‐
ways	  possible	  to	  trace	  in	  the	  reflections	  of	  the	  second	  Wittgenstein	  a	  pictorial	  account	  
of	  language:	  the	  two	  analogies	  end	  up	  completing	  each	  other.	  
On	  one	  side	  the	  musical	  metaphor	  helps	  us	  understand	  the	  fact	  that	  «For	  knowledge	  
is	   not	   translated	   into	  words	  when	   it	   is	   expressed.	   The	  words	   are	   not	   a	   translation	   of	  
something	   else	   that	  was	   there	  before»	   (Wittgenstein	   [1980]:	   133);	   on	   the	  other	  Witt-­‐
genstein	  claims	  that	  «I	  said	  that	  a	  proposition	  is	  laid	  alongside	  reality	  like	  a	  yardstick:	  […]	  
And	  like	  yardstick,	  neither	  does	  it	  determine	  anything,	  so	  long	  as	  one	  doesn’t	  measure	  
with	   it.	   But	  measuring	   is	   comparing	   (and	  needs	   to	  be	   called	   translating)»	   (Bouveresse	  
(1973):	  182-­‐183;	  Wittgenstein	  [2005]:	  70),	  where	  the	  translation	  always	  is	  translation	  of	  
something.	  
Language	   never	   chooses	   a	  model	   refusing	   the	   other	   one:	   it	   remains	   indecisive	   be-­‐
tween	  pictorial	   technique	  and	  musical	  nuance.	  «The	  maximal	   realism	  of	   the	   “name	  of	  
the	   objects	   discovers	   its	   own	   objective	   desperation:	   it	   cannot	   hope	   to	   possess	   them»	  
(Cacciari,	  [19772]:	  163).	  In	  the	  extreme	  proximity	  the	  aroma	  of	  the	  experienced	  thing	  is	  
sensed	  in	  musical	  tones,	  the	  representative	  nature	  of	  language	  shows	  its	  aura	  through	  a	  
figurative	  technique.	  Musicality	  is	  the	  echo	  of	  a	  thing	  (die	  Sache	  selbst),	  lost	  in	  the	  very	  
moment	   of	   its	   perception.	   «The	   experienced	   thing	   disappears	   in	   its	   being-­‐formulated.	  
Naming	  is	  the	  act	  of	  that	  renunciation	  and	  of	  this	  disappearance»	  (Cacciari	  [19772]:	  162).	  
If	  we	  want	  to	  place	  this	  perspective	  about	  language	  within	  its	  cultural	  context,	  we	  are	  
able	   to	  draw	  several	   similarities	  with	   the	  Viennese	  atmosphere	  of	   the	   first	  decades	  of	  
the	  20th	  century.	  
Starting	   from	  Loos’	  essay,	  Ornament	  and	  Crime	   (Loos	   [1908]:	  19-­‐24),	  where	   the	  or-­‐
nament,	   symbol	  of	   an	  entire	  age,	   is	   «wasted	   labour	  power	  and	  hence	  wasted	  health»	  
(Loos	  [1908]:	  22).	  «Freedom	  from	  ornament	  is	  a	  sign	  of	  spiritual	  strength»	  (Loos	  [1908]:	  
24).	  Here	  we	  find	  exactly	  Wittgenstein’s	  point:	  «Loos	  insists	  on	  the	  impossibility	  to	  find	  a	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schematic	  solution	  of	  Langue	  and	  linguistic	  technique.	  The	  meaning	  of	  propositions	  can-­‐
not	  be	  found	  in	  the	  absolute	  unit	  of	  an	  eternal	  and	  ideal	  syntax»	  (Cacciari	  [1975]:	  17).	  
The	  main	  question	  of	  the	  contemporary	  Zivilisation	   is	  the	  fact	  that	  «there	  is	  no	  syn-­‐
thesis:	  not	  “industrial	  crafts”,	  nor	  “industrial	  art”	  –	  but	  art	  and	  industry,	  art	  and	  crafts,	  
music	  and	  drama,	  painting	  and	  music»	  (Cacciari	  [1975]:	  17)	  and	  this	  “and”	  is	  to	  be	  read	  
as	  a	   “non	  compatibility”:	  art	  does	  not	   sublimate	   technique,	  nor	   is	   industrial	   technique	  
able	   to	   reach	   the	  quality	  of	  art.	   In	   the	   same	  way	   language,	  according	   to	  Wittgenstein,	  
cannot	  be	   reduced	   to	  mere	   representational	   technique,	  nor	   to	   a	   simple	  melody	   to	  be	  
heard	  by	  the	  perfect	  ear	  for	  music.	  Language	  is	  always	  one	  thing	  “and”	  the	  other,	  paint-­‐
ing	  “and”	  music.	  
These	  questions	  necessitate	  a	  metaphor	  able	  to	  sum	  up	  these	  opposites,	  by	  keeping	  
their	  tragical	  conflict:	  language	  as	  a	  linguistic	  game,	  in	  particular	  as	  chess10.	  
4.	  The	  “Language”	  of	  Chess	  
Thinking	  of	  language	  as	  a	  game	  is	  not	  a	  solution,	  rather	  the	  statement	  of	  a	  conflict:	  the	  
game	  demands	  to	  be	  a	  world	  –	  is	  actually	  a	  world	  in	  itself	  –	  thus	  not	  coincident	  with	  the	  
world.	  Eugen	  Fink	  claims	  that	  in	  the	  game:	  «the	  whole	  reflects	  in	  itself	  and	  appears	  “in	  a	  
picture”.	  The	  “TOTUM”	  returns	  in	  a	  part	  of	  itself	  and	  elevates	  this	  piece	  of	  the	  world,	  by	  
reflecting	  itself	  in	  it»	  (Fink	  [1960]:	  126).	  
In	  its	  conventionality,	  when	  the	  rules	  are	  set,	  the	  game	  is	  part	  of	  the	  world;	  but	  with-­‐
in	  those	  rules	  the	  convention	  disappears:	  once	  the	  determined,	  the	  game	  is	  the	  world.	  
Huinziga	   is	  closed	  to	  Fink’s	  analysis	  when	  he	  said:	  «No	  skepticism	  is	  possible	  where	  
the	  rules	  of	  a	  game	  are	  concerned,	   for	   the	  principle	  underlying	  them	   is	  an	  unshakable	  
truth.	  Indeed,	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  rules	  are	  transgressed	  the	  whole	  play-­‐world	  collapses.	  The	  
game	  is	  over»11	  (Huizinga	  [1939]:	  11).	  
The	   image	   becomes	  music,	   because	   it	   only	  manifests	   itself;	  music	   remains	   panting,	  
because	  it	  continues	  to	  hint	  at	  something	  else:	  the	  metaphor	  of	  chess	  is	  suitable	  to	  Witt-­‐
genstein's	   thought.	   In	   the	   language,	   as	   in	   the	   game	  «Das	   TOTUM	   ist	   “in	   parte”»	   (Fink	  
[1960]:	  169).	  
 
10	  Max	  Black	   ([1988]:	  241)	  counted	  98	  occurences	  of	   the	  expression	  “lingustic	  game”	  and	  59	  of	  
“chess”	  or	  “chess	  piece”	  (cf.	  also	  Kaal,	  McKinnon	  [1975]).	  
11	   Huizinga	   refers	   to	   Valéry	   (1945):	   81:	   «Pas	   de	   scepticisme	   possible	   à	   l’égard	   des	   règles	   d’un	  
jeu». 
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The	  formula	  of	  chess	  as	  a	  model	  for	  a	  linguistic	  game	  is	  used	  and	  detailed	  on	  several	  
occasions.	  Similarities	  refer	   to	  rules	  of	   the	  game:	  «Just	  as	   in	  a	  chess	  game	  we	   learn	  to	  
use	  the	  king	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  pawns	  and	  the	  word	  “king”	  together	  with	  the	  word	  
“checkmate”»	   (Wittgenstein	   [1980]:	   II,	   25),	   but	   also	   to	   the	   peculiar	   connection	   of	   the	  
pieces	  within	   the	  game.	  «As	   if	   there	  could	  be	  a	  debate	  about	  whether	   the	  king	  or	   the	  
chessboard	  is	  more	  essential	  to	  chess»	  (Wittgenstein	  [2005]:	  92).	  Language	  and	  its	  rules	  
are	  very	  much	  alike	  to	  chess:	  «A	  rule	  –	  as	  I	  understand	  it	  –	  is	  like	  a	  path	  in	  a	  garden.	  Or	  
like	   the	  pre-­‐established	  squares	  on	  a	  chessboard	  or	   the	   lines	   in	  a	   table»	   (Wittgenstein	  
[2005]:	  191).	  
The	  nexus	  between	  a	  single	  proposition	  and	  the	  entire	  amount	  of	  propositions	  that	  
constitutes	  a	   language	   is	  analogous	  to	  the	   link	  between	  a	  single	  square	  and	  the	  entire	  
chessboard:	  «Is	  one	  square	  of	  a	  chessboard	  simpler	  than	  the	  whole	  chessboard?»	  (Witt-­‐
genstein	  [2005]:	  329).	  
The	  old	  illusion	  of	  getting	  to	  the	  simple	  object,	  is	  finally	  crushed	  by	  the	  consideration	  
of	  the	  rule	  as	  a	  «concept	  with	  blurred	  edges»	  (Wittgenstein	  [2005]:	  193).	  	  This	  fuzziness	  
belongs	  to	  every	  name,	  to	  every	  grammar	  rule.	  
Chess	   rules	   can	   be	   summarized	   in	   a	   couple	   of	   pages:	   a	   paragraph	   can	   explain	   the	  
structure	   of	   the	   chessboard	   and	   the	   positions	   of	   the	   pieces;	   another	   can	   explain	   the	  
moves	  allowed	  to	  the	  single	  figures;	  a	  third	  one	  can	  give	  an	  account	  of	  castling,	  passed	  
pawn,	  king	  in	  check,	  checkmate,	  stalemate,	  tie.	  In	  these	  terms	  chess	  seems	  to	  avoid	  the	  
multiplicity	  of	  nuances	  and	  variations	  of	  the	  linguistic	  game,	  but	  those	  rules	  generate	  an	  
extraordinary	  amount	  of	  strategies.	  
The	  language	  of	  chess	  grows	  depending	  on	  who	  is	  speaking	  –	  as	  any	  other	  language	  
does.	  By	  practicing	  this	  linguistic	  game	  one	  can	  learn	  the	  importance	  of	  conquering	  the	  
centre	  and	  will	   therefore	  begin	   to	  use	   the	   “gambit”.	   Like	   in	  any	  other	   language	   terms	  
will	  fall	  into	  disuse,	  such	  as	  the	  Scandinavian	  defense	  or	  the	  Ponziani	  opening,	  nowadays	  
very	  rarely	  used.	  
In	   analogy	  with	   language,	   a	   piece	   is	   never	   “just	   a	   piece”:	   a	   pawn	   can	   be	   isolated,	  
passed,	  doubled,	  wrong	  rook;	  the	  knight	   is	  a	  queen-­‐knight	  or	  a	  king-­‐knight;	  the	  bishop	  
can	  be	  a	  dark-­‐squared	  bishop	  or	  a	  light-­‐square	  bishop,	  the	  king	  himself	  can	  be	  in	  check,	  
a	  king	  side	  castling	  and	  so	  on.	  
Every	   linguistic	   strategy	   has	   its	   variations	   and	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   language	   in-­‐
creases	  even	  because	  of	  an	  historical	  perspective:	  some	  strategies	  remained	  emblematic	  
for	  their	  mistakes,	  some	  others	  for	  the	  variations	  produced.	  Therefore	  we	  have	  Steinitz	  
defense,	  Rubinstein	  variation,	  Alechin	  attack.	  Some	  games	  remained	   in	  the	  annals,	   like	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Nimzowitsch-­‐Capablanca	  in	  1927;	  Tal-­‐Pachman	  in	  1961;	  Kovalek-­‐Pomar	  in	  1972;	  or	  Kas-­‐
parov’s	   game	   against	   the	   computer	   program	   Deep	   Junior	   (Schenk	   [2006]:	   226-­‐227).	  
Those	  games	  are	  remembered	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  new	  possibilities	  they	  opened	  up,	  because	  
of	  the	  new	  linguistic	  potential	  discovered.	  
The	  chess	  language	  can	  be	  enriched	  very	  quickly	  in	  a	  semantic	  of	  the	  pieces	  and	  each	  
piece,	  and	  when	  connected	  to	  the	  others	  and	  to	  the	  possible	  moves	  there	  is	  a	  real	  syn-­‐
tax.	  What	  is	  hence	  a	  single	  piece	  alone,	  or	  a	  single	  strategy	  alone?	  A	  very	  fuzzy	  concept.	  
At	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	   complexity,	   chess	   is	   not	   a	   simple	   representation	   of	   a	  world:	   it	  
shows	   the	   features	   of	   an	   internal	   musicality.	   «Someone	   who	   doesn’t	   know	   anything	  
about	  chess	  and	  sees	  someone	  making	  a	  move	  won’t	  understand	   it,	   i.	  e.	  won’t	  under-­‐
stand	  it	  as	  a	  move	  of	  a	  game»	  (Wittgenstein	  [2005]:	  113).	  
In	  addition	   to	   this,	  we	  can	   see	   that	   the	  amateur	  playing	   chess	   is	   far	   from	  attaining	  
that	  musicality	  for	  which	  the	  expert	  has	  developed	  a	  perfect	  ear,	  ready	  to	  listen	  to	  any	  
nuances,	  because	  even	  a	  tiny	  variation	  can	  change	  the	  end	  of	  the	  game.	  
If	  we	  listen	  to	  the	  melody	  of	  a	  linguistic	  game	  with	  a	  very	  good	  ear,	  we	  must	  recog-­‐
nise	  that	  the	  name	  does	  not	  have	  the	  object	  as	  it	  were	  on	  a	  lead	  (Wittgenstein	  [1980]:	  
110).	   If	   comprehending	   a	   game	   coincides	  with	   the	   ability	   to	   use	   a	   language	   (Wittgen-­‐
stein	  [2005]:	  74),	  this	  use	  is	  a	  practice	  that	  aims	  to	  capture	  a	  world.	  A	  world	  that	  fades	  
into	  translations.	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